The Cinematic Generalissimo

     The relationship between military theory and military strategy, linked via the perceptive mind, sets the conditions for human-based causation in war. War is a discipline containing infinite variables as well as a distinct relationship between military theory and military strategy. Military theory is a mental exercise to understand the tangible and abstract forces of war, while military strategy is the manifestation of that understanding to action. Both military theory and military strategy are thought processes in the generalissimo’s mind, which links the two perceptions of understanding.  In other words, the mind links learning with action and the perceptions of both learning (military theory) and action (military strategy). War, therefore, is perception.

     An apt analogy to describe the perceptual relationship between military theory and military strategy is the idea of war as a visual input entering a motion picture camera lens (vintage style in using film). The film in the camera captures inputs as every perceivable action including that of the enemy, political leadership, and the civil population. The raw film is a perception of the war.  The director, representing the generalissimo, edits the film-perception via military theory.  Military strategy is the director’s finished film as projected on screen, thereby displaying a second edit or perception from that initially captured on the raw film. Below is an illustration of this analogy.

Figure 1.  Film Analogy of Military Theory – Military Strategy Relationship 

(See image above article title)

     Evidence for the perceptual relationship between military theory and military strategy flows from the areas of science to theory to strategy. Robert Jervis and Thomas S. Kuhn represent the scientific approach, Carl von Clausewitz represents military theory, while Everett Carl Dolman speaks for the strategists. This essay also follows the relational analogy of the camera to director to final film (see Figure 1) as the generalissimo produces military strategy from military theory and war inputs. J.F.C. Fuller fulfills the role of film critic by providing a counterargument.

     A definition of war is necessary to provide a contextual framework in which to relate military theory and military strategy. War, as defined by Carl von Clausewitz, “is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 75). This is the classic definition of war that must be acknowledged since it often serves as the initial cognitive-framing device in strategic perceptions. Military theory is the study of war and the vast factors intersecting within war.  Military theory is learning; it is the perception created by understanding environment, data, and causation. Clausewitz agreed that theory should be “study, not doctrine” (Clausewitz, 141). This theoretical perception within the mind links to military strategy. As with war and military theory, there are competing definitions of military strategy. Clausewitz claims military strategy is the “use of engagements for the object of the war” (Clausewitz, 128). Perception, as used throughout this essay, is the mindful ordering of data, culture, beliefs, ideologies, and internal and external stimuli that produce an individual’s synthesized worldview. The mind can be influenced by a learned perception of military theory to craft a military strategy. The key link in the relational chain is the perceptive mind (the director/generalissimo).

     Social scientist Robert Jervis provides evidence to support that perception relates military theory to military strategy. He argues that states, and thereby their decision-makers, are influenced by their perceptions and misperceptions of intentions, stimuli, and processes (Jervis, 33). These three factors originate internally from the decision-maker, and externally from other actor(s). This relationship can be extrapolated toward military matters to mean a generalissimo is influenced by his perception of military theory to plan a military strategy. This explanation is not deliberately obtuse but intentionally referencing two separate perceptions linked by the mind: the perception of theoretical understanding and the perceived application of that understanding through strategy. Jervis would liken this relationship to consistency theory meaning “the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate information into pre-existing images” (Jervis, 117). The generalissimo will use his theoretical underpinnings, including experience, to prepare the strategic plan. His military theory will be reflected within his military strategy, displaying mental consistency. 

     Jervis also allows for different perceptions to arise from different theories (Jervis, 163). In other words, as theories may change over time, the perception of data sets may also change. Jervis uses the example of Mahan-influenced strategists, who believe in command of the sea, to perceive 16th Century naval battles differently than the strategists involved in that action (Jervis, 168). The data has not changed although there may be a difference in the “evoked set,” which is stimuli that brings concerns to the forefront of the strategist’s mind (Jervis, 203). The modern generalissimo’s perception of strategy is different than his historical counterpart based upon his mind’s perception of more recent theories. Perception, based on Jervis’ explanations, is still the critical descriptor of the relationship between military theory and military strategy.

     Jervis acknowledges that the “necessary interdependence of facts and theories” overlaps into the work of Thomas S. Kuhn (Jervis, 156). Kuhn appears to support the perceptive relationship between military theory and military strategy. When the generalissimo’s consistency of worldview changes, he experiences a paradigm shift. This phenomenon, according to Kuhn, occurs when an individual sees the world differently than before the new knowledge was acquired. He also states that the individual post-paradigm shift inhabits a different world than in the past (Kuhn, 111).  This paradigm shift is aligned with a change in perception. For the generalissimo, both his perception of theory and his strategic perception from theory have changed. The relationship between military theory and military strategy is altered.

     The generalissimo’s perception of events will evolve as new factors are introduced into the theoretical calculus within his mind. His strategy may also evolve. In the director’s analogy, there may be several film edits released to the public: the director’s cut, the studio cut, the television broadcast version, an “ultimate edition,” and an anniversary box set. Kuhn warns of the dangers of someone who does not engage a problem set with a “previous visual-conceptual experience” (Kuhn, 113). The generalissimo must maintain within his mind a theoretical underpinning, a foundational knowledge, to make sense of war inputs that demand a strategy. If this foundation does not exist, the generalissimo may only experience what philosopher and psychologist William James called “a bloomin’ buzzin’ confusion” (Kuhn, 113).

     War inputs and the generalissimo’s perceptive mind are explored by Carl von Clausewitz in On War. Clausewitz identifies the “essence of the military genius” as “all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity” (Clausewitz, 100). The generalissimo is not one-dimensional. He must react to the multitude of war inputs along with his pre-conceived notions of military theory to produce an appropriate military strategy. The director in the editing room must manipulate pacing, sound, color, and composition along with his foundational film theory to bring his final film to life.  

     Clausewitz states that “war is the realm of chance” (Clausewitz, 101). He attempts to tame the unknown and the unknowable with the generalissimo’s capability, that is knowledge “so absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way” (Clausewitz, 147). Capability is the potential for mental action driven by the mind’s perception of knowledge.  The generalissimo can perceive the unknown when supported by military theory and experience.  The director can perceive a coherent story from miles of unedited film, a screenplay, and storyboards. It is impossible for the generalissimo to know everything about the infinite war variables as they occur, but he can plan a military strategy to confront the situation in a capable manner. His perceptive understanding of military theory in context with the war inputs will form the basis of his military strategy. 

     Modern strategist Everett Carl Dolman argues that even the concept of victory is merely a perception (Dolman, 6). His assertion, that a successful strategist need not be concerned with victory, furthers the argument of perception’s critical role in the relationship between military theory and military strategy. Dolman describes theory as “the filter through which our mind perceives the world; through which it organizes thought” (Dolman, 12). The generalissimo’s mind uses perception based on military theory to make sense of the war inputs as ultimately expressed in his military strategy. The generalissimo must also be mindful of Dolman’s warning of an untenable strategy in response to the open nature of war with infinite variables that will never be fully accounted (Dolman, 13). Dolman proclaims, “There is no beginning or end for the strategist; there is only more, or less” (Dolman, 13). The director, like many artists, will eventually be forced to distribute a product even when he perceives the work is unfinished.  Enemy action or political mandate, likewise, will demand a military strategy.

     J.F.C. Fuller provides a counterargument to military theory related to military strategy via perception. His three spheres of force (war) include the Mental Sphere, Moral Sphere, and the Physical Sphere (Fuller, 57). The most substantial objection to perception describing the relationship between military theory and military strategy is within the Physical Sphere. Fuller describes the necessity of the Physical Sphere with the Mental and Moral Spheres to win a war together and that they cannot win a war separately (Fuller, 145-146). He emphasizes the physical force of weapons against the enemy within the Physical Sphere as they deliver the blows that morale and willpower cannot create to achieve victory (Fuller, 174). His view is analogous to the director (see Figure 1) editing his film without mindfulness of public reception of the final product.  Fuller’s generalissimo sees weapons as the physical tools to achieve physical effects on the enemy. This worldview negates the link of weapons development in response to perceived need. Every weapon above that of a human fist was designed due to a perception within the human mind. That weapon was developed to be used in a military strategy, a product of perception, in response to the generalissimo’s perceived application of military theory to the war inputs. The generalissimo with the most accurate perception of the war will likely devise the best military strategy to achieve his objective. Fuller argues that the best weapons, as contained within the Physical Sphere, are essential to the best strategy (Fuller, 146). The perceptive generalissimo, on the contrary, will be involved in weapon development and its place within the greater military strategy. This is mental force rather than physical force.

     In conclusion, perception describes the relationship between military theory and military strategy. This view is consistent with that of Jervis, Kuhn, Clausewitz, and Dolman.  This perceptual relationship spans the disciplines of science, theory, and strategy. Although he provides a counterargument, Fuller’s allegiance to the physicality of war nullifies his attempt to subjugate the human mind to the human hand in warfare. The director will edit his film on a foundation of knowledge (inputs), experience, and film theory to produce a finished product shown to audiences. The generalissimo must use his mind including his knowledge of military theory, in response to wartime inputs, to produce the best military strategy. The generalissimo is thereby directed by his perception.

Works Cited

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 

     Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Dolman, Everett Carl. Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age. 

    New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005.

Fuller, J.F.C. The Foundations of the Science of War. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926.

Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

    University Press, 1976.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 

    Press, 2012.